Are Policy Reform and Growth in Africa Sustainable? by Jean-Louis ARCAND et al.





Document de travail de la série
Etudes et Documents
E 2001.05
Are Policy Reform and Growth in Africa
Sustainable?
Jean-Louis ARCAND, Patrick GUILLAUMONT
Sylviane GUILLAUMONT JEANNENEY
February 2001, 30 p.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
ARE POLICY REFORM AND GROWTH IN AFRICA SUSTAINABLE?
Jean-Louis ARCAND*, Patrick GUILLAUMONT**
et Sylviane GUILLAUMONT JEANNENEY**
Abstract
This paper, relying on the results of several cross-sectionnal growth regressions, examines
the factors determining the sustainability of policy reforms and growth in Africa. Five
structural factors are considered as determinants of policy: 1) ethno-linguistic fragmentation,
which influences growth directly rather than through policy, 2) human capital, which due to
its low level is an impediment to good policy, although its effect is in all likelihood waning, 3)
vulnerability to external shocks, possibly dampened thanks to better management and
democratization, 4) political factors, mainly political instability and violence, which
themselves partly depend on the previous factors, 5) foreign aid which could be allocated and
"conditionned" so as to be more conducive to policy reform and growth. A simplified
structural model of growth and policy, estimated in first differences and by GMM, and
supplemented by an estimate of a political instability function, summarizes the main lines of
our arguments.
Résumé
Cet article examine, en s'appuyant sur les résultats de plusieurs analyses transversales de la
croissance, les facteurs de soutenabilité des réformes et de la croissance en Afrique. Il
s'interroge sur cinq déterminants structurels de la politique économique : 1) la fragmentation
ethno-linguistique, qui semble agir directement sur la croissance et non par l'intermédiaire de
la politique économique,  2) le capital humain dont  le faible niveau exerce sur la politique
des effets négatifs mais vraisemblablement déclinants, 3) la vulnérabilité aux chocs
extérieurs, éventuellement atténuée grâce à une meilleure gestion et à la démocratisation, 4)
les facteurs spécifiquement politiques, en particulier l'instabilité politique et la violence, qui
elles-mêmes dépendent en partie des facteurs précédents, 5) l'aide extérieure, dont les
principes d'allocation et la conditionnalité pourraient être conçus de façon à en améliorer
l'impact sur la croissance et la politique. Un modèle structurel simplifié de la croissance et de
la politique économique, estimé en première différence et en GMM, puis complété par
l'estimation d'une fonction d'instabilité politique, résume l'ensemble des arguments présentés.
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Introduction
During the past decades, Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth SSA) has suffered from extremely
low rates of economic growth.  This stagnation, and sometimes decline, in GDP per capita
has been the focus of a plethora of studies leading to several competing interpretations (see
e.g. Collier and Gunning 1999b, 1999c). As the putative causes for Africa’s stagnation were
being identified, some of them appearing to be insurmountable, Africa experienced a
resurgence in growth.  Indeed, by the mid-90s, the average (unweighted) growth rate of GDP
per capita in SSA was higher than it was in other developing countries (Ndulu and O'Connell,
1999, see also Figure 1). However, since 1999-2000 the average rate of growth has fallen,
reversing once again the position of Africa relative to the rest of the world.
Was this new spurt of growth but a short-term phenomenon linked to the international
environment?  Was it at best associated with convergence and catching-up effects? Or did it
mean that SSA was finally reaping the benefits of twenty years of painful structural reforms
and emerging onto a stable growth path?  Figure 2 shows that several scalar measures of
economic policy have improved significantly over the past 15 years. Typical examples for
instance include the composite indicator of macropolicy developed by Burnside and Dollar,
1997, or the indicator of structural reform proposed by Bonaglia, Goldstein and Richaud,
2000).
While numerous studies have utilized cross-sectional (or panel) econometrics to analyze the
causes of SSA’s stagnation, very few have considered the sustainability of the current
resurgence in SSA’s growth using the same tools, though several papers have recently been
concerned with the future perspectives for African growth (they are summarized in Hugon
and Sudrie, 2000)
1. The last World Bank Report (2000) on Africa, covering a large set of
issues, is itself, as shown by its title – Can Africa Claim The 21
st Century- looks for the
perspectives of African growth. But it does not directly question the reasons why African
growth is so fragile and why growth episodes have become so short.
                                                
1 Charles C. Soludo (2000) has rightly insisted that the good growth performance of sub-Saharan Africa does not
allow one to make direct inferences concerning its sustainability. He has suggested a number of structural
indicators which, by comparison with the Asian economies (or higher growth African economies), should allow
one to assess sustainability. Neither the pertinence of these indicators, nor their relative weighting, has, however,
been assessed empirically.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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In the context of the OECD Development Center research project on "Emerging Africa"
Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Varadoukis, 1999a, 1999b, have constructed an
indicator of the sustainability of growth, and used it to identify 14 African countries that
might conceivably "emerge" in the near future.  They then examined the potential growth of
these countries if (i) they were to implement policies as "good" as those of the fastest-growing
African countries and (ii) if the external environment remained similar to what it had been on
average). This study has thus shown that the sustainability of growth in Africa strongly
depends on how long lasting the improvement in economic policy is. It has not, however,
considered how exogenous factors affect policies themselves. In a recent paper, produced
within the same OECD project, Berthélemy and Söderling (2001) underline the role of capital
accumulation and economic diversification as key elements of sustained growth in Africa and
offer a tested explanation of capital deepening, but not of diversification. Both elements are of
course dependent on policies, which themselves remained to be explained.
The purpose of the present paper is precisely to consider how exogenous factors affect
policies.  Indeed, it can be argued that the sustainability of growth in SSA largely depends
upon the sustainability of good policies that are, in turn, influenced by various exogenous
factors.  This means that a number of exogenous factors that have been identified in the
literature as affecting growth may do so both directly and, may be, even more through their
impact on policies which, indirectly, affect growth.
Cross-sectional econometric analysis is a powerful tool that may be of invaluable use in
identifying those factors that are conducive to the adoption of good economic policies.  It
does, however, have its limits (see e.g. Temple, 1999).  This is particularly true for SSA
where it rapidly becomes obvious that sample size is determined by those variables that one
wishes to include in a given regression.  Whether one is working with a sample constituted of
developing countries or a sample constituted exclusively of SSA countries, missing data is,
more often than not, associated with SSA countries that have experienced serious difficulties.
This implicit sample selection bias can lead to inappropriate statistical inference.  It is
therefore crucial to supplement cross-sectional analysis of those factors that lie behind the
process of reform in SSA with country-specific studies.
In what follows, and in light of existing results stemming from the cross-sectional empirical
literature, we consider the sustainability of reforms and growth in SSA.  We do so through theCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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analytical lenses provided by the leading explanations for Africa's poor growth performance
in the past, with an emphasis on those hypotheses that stress the interactions between
structural determinants of growth and economic policies.
The analysis that follows is in large part based on the estimation of a simple structural model
in which a growth equation is coupled with a macroeconomic policy equation (the latter being
captured by the Burnside and Dollar (1997) policy index). This model, estimated on a panel of
four nine-year periods, allows for country-specific effects (through  first-differencing) and
accounts for the endogeneity of a number of explanatory variables (through the use of a GMM
procedure). The most notable result is that improved growth performance is seen to be a direct
result of an exogenous improvement in policies during the 1989-97 period.
As such, we begin by considering the role of ethno-linguistic fragmentation, which is
particularly severe in many African states, and which, it has been argued, has led to poor
policy choices.  While acknowledging the importance of ethnic factors in Africa, we argue
that they do not affect growth through policy choices and do not, therefore, constitute an
insurmountable obstacle to African growth.  We then show that low initial levels of human
capital do indeed constitute an important fetter on growth, and that this factor operates
through several different channels.  One such mechanism, which has been neglected in the
literature, involves the effect of human capital on policies.  Through, among various factors,
foreign aid, a sustained improvement in levels of human capital may thus lead to an
improvement in the policy environment.
We then re-examine the hypothesis according to which the high degree of exposure of SSA to
exogenous shocks (in international prices, exports, or the climate) lowers the growth rate of
GDP per capita through its impact on policies.  While exposure to such shocks remains
problematic, it would appear that SSA states have improved their capacity to deal with them,
and may improve even upon their recent successes even further.  Besides such exogenous
shocks, we also consider the impact of authoritarianism, political instability, and armed
conflicts, which arguably constitute the main danger faced by SSA states today.  Identifying
the factors that lie behind these internal dangers would appear to be essential in the context of
assessing the sustainability of reforms and growth in SSA.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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Singling out the determinants of economic policy allows one to grasp the manner through
which foreign aid can contribute to sustainable growth in SSA.  Given that difficulties with
the implementation of policies are partly attributable to the structural environment, aid can be
seen as a manner of weakening structural constraints that affect policy-making and therefore
economic growth.
Ethnicity and policy
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation has sometimes been identified as an important causal factor
behind poor macroeconomic policies in SSA and therefore as being a root cause of SSA's
poor growth performance (Easterly and Levine, 1997). If this were the case, ethnolinguistic
fragmentation would constitute an almost insurmountable obstacle to reform and growth in
SSA.  This interpretation has been contested in terms of the robustness of the econometric
evidence (Arcand, Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2000a).
We do not deny that ethnolinguistic fragmentation plays a particularly important role in SSA,
on the one hand because ethnolinguistic fragmentation is greater on average in SSA than in
other regions of the world, and on the other because its marginal impact on growth would
appear to be greater in SSA than elsewhere.  But the econometric evidence does not support
the claim that ethnolinguistic fragmentation affects growth indirectly through its impact on
economic policy, which would thus, because of the high degree of ethnolinguistic
fragmentation in SSA, be particularly poor there.  Rather, ethnolinguistic fragmentation
would appear to impact growth directly through its effect on the microeconomic behavior of
agents that determines the efficiency of the allocation of resources.  Moreover, this direct
effect of ethnolinguistic fragmentation on growth would appear to be particularly severe in
countries where communications costs are high (associated with high rates of illiteracy and
low population density, for example), which is typical of countries in SSA (Arcand,
Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney 1999, 2000b).  Another hypothesis that has recently
been subjected to empirical testing is that ethnolinguistic fragmentation increases the risk of
conflict, but that this effect is mitigated by a greater degree of democracy (Collier, 2000,
Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). A further point that has been stressed by the recent literature
is the non-linearity of the effects of ethnic fragmentation, which suggests that polarization
into a small number of ethnic groups may be more dangerous than fragmentation per se whichCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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can (when human capital levels are high) become an asset (cf. for instance Arcand and alii
2000a, 2000b, Collier 2000, Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000).
The upshot of these different papers concerning ethnolinguistic fragmentation and SSA is
therefore less gloomy than one was at first led to believe. Ethnolinguistic fragmentation does
not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to growth in SSA, and its deleterious effects can be
reduced through literacy campaigns and a greater degree of democracy. It then even may
become an advantage.
Human capital and policy
The impact of human capital (education and health) on growth remains poorly understood in
the context of cross-sectional empirical work, and this is particularly true for Africa, despite
what a priori should be a key role  (see Arcand, Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney 2001,
O'Connell and Ndulu, 2000, Schultz 1999).   There would appear to be three reasons behind
this paradox.  First, it is difficult to adequately measure human capital, be it education or
health, and the latter is often neglected in empirical work.  Second, it is not easy, in theoretical
terms, to properly specify the relationship linking growth with human capital.  In particular, it
is often not clear whether human capital should enter in levels or in growth rates, and
empirical counterparts to either are often ambiguous in nature.  Third, human capital is likely
to be an endogenous variable in any growth equation and it is notoriously difficult to come up
with appropriate admissible instruments that should not be already included in the
specification (Arcand, 2000).
An important effect of human capital that has been less emphasized in the literature than its
direct effect on factor productivity is its probable impact on economic policy.  Human capital
increases the capacity to formulate and implement appropriate economic policies because a
well-educated (and healthy) body of politicians and bureaucrats increases the speed, quality
and implementation of economic policy-making.  Moreover, a well-educated population
increases the ease with which policies can be explained and understood and, one may hope,
accepted.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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Several other reasons suggest that the quality of policies is affected by the level of human
capital.  When the level of human capital is low, there is great pressure to increase it.  This
pressure is felt in the realm of public finance: deficits may obtain or, in order to avoid this,
taxation may be unduly heavy.  More generally, the aforementioned pressures may lead
policymakers to shun policy reforms that, at least in the short run, involve high budgetary
costs (liberalizing foreign trade, for example).  This effect is particularly strong in SSA both
because of high rates of demographic growth and because the relative price of education, and
probably of health as well, is especially great.  The consequence is that achieving a given
level of educational attainment through public schooling implies higher levels of public
expenditures devoted to education than elsewhere (Calipel and Guillaumont, 1995).  It is
possible empirically to identify the impact of the average number of years of schooling in the
population on the quality of macroeconomic policy through its effect on a combination of
different indicators such as the rate of inflation, the budget deficit and the degree of openness
(Guillaumont and Chauvet, 1999, 2001).
What conclusions can be drawn regarding the sustainability of reforms and growth in SSA?
The level of human capital is manifestly low in SSA, both in absolute terms and also once one
controls for its structural determinants (Schultz 1999).  Should one conclude that the low level
of human capital therefore constitutes a durable obstacle to good policies in SSA?  Without
underestimating its importance, there are at least three good reasons for one to be optimistic.
First, school enrollment rates, which fell during the 1980s, appear to be on the rise again.
Second, the real depreciation of numerous currencies in the region (in particular, the CFA
Franc) has reduced the relative price of investment in human capital (in particular in
education) because this form of expenditure involves an important labor component.  Third,
foreign aid has been increasingly directed toward reinforcing human capital, be it in the form
of the emphasis on capacity building over several years, the initiative aimed at reducing the
level of indebtedness of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), or the new IMF Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) relying on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP) which consider specifically objectives in terms of health and education.  On the other
hand, a major deterioration in human capital is to be expected from the AIDS epidemic
(which chiefly affects prime-age adults and especially those who are relatively well-educated)
which will also increase the dependency ratio (already very high in Africa).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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Vulnerability to external shocks and the sustainability of policies
Casual observation of the economic cycle in SSA reveals that it is intimately related to the
terms of trade.  Recently, Deaton (1999) has underscored this relationship (see Figure 4).  A
striking illustration is given by Ivorian GDP per capita, which is clearly highly correlated with
the prices of coffee and cocoa.
Countries in SSA are particularly vulnerable to external shocks for two reasons.  First, a large
fraction of their exports are still constituted by primary products whose prices exhibit large
fluctuations.  Second, their small size (in demographic terms) implies that exports constitute
(for structural reasons) an important portion of their GDPs, which is therefore more
vulnerable to variations in export earnings
2.
The international environment and domestic policies are often seen as substitutes in the
context of cross-sectional analyses of growth, in the sense that good policies are seen as
having the potential to compensate for a poor international environment and vice versa.  But
vulnerability to external shocks obtains precisely, and this is especially the case in Africa,
because external shocks affect policies themselves.  Assessing the permanent or transitory
nature of a given shock can be difficult and the appropriate policy response is therefore often
not identified.  Public expenditures and external indebtedness often rise during booms, and are
well-nigh impossible to reverse during a bust, since the boom is expected to continue, but
does not.  The exchange rate is often maintained during a recession, again in the expectation
of a boom that does not materialize.  Conversely, the currency may be depreciated in response
to the slightest external shock, although the latter may be transitory, with the usual
consequences in terms of inflation.  Stop and go policies in terms of trade liberalization may
also obtain, leading to the inevitable loss in credibility.
Alongside the vast literature on external shocks dealing with several SSA countries (Collier,
Gunning and Associates, 1999), cross-sectional econometrics has also identified the general
link that ties policies to external shocks.  For example, O'Connell and Ndulu (2000) note that
the introduction of economic policy variables into a growth regression (based on a pooled
                                                
2 It has to be recalled that economic vulnerability has been recognized by the Committee for Development Policy
and by ECOSOC as one of the criteria relevant to identify the least developed countries, a major part of which
are African countries (on the vulnerability issue, see Guillaumont 2000)CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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sample of five-year averages) leads to a fall in the statistical significance of the coefficient
associated with the variation in the terms of trade.  In an earlier article we have shown that
instability in the terms of trade leads to instability in the investment rate and the real exchange
rate, the latter two variables being identified as "intermediate" policy variables that, in turn,
are significant determinants of growth (Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Brun,
1999).
The relationships linking external shocks and economic policies reflect the past behavior of
states, leading us to ask what one can conclude concerning the sustainability of reform and
growth in SSA on the basis of the previous arguments.  It is too much to expect a fall in the
near future in the magnitude of the external shocks faced by SSA countries (markets for
primary commodities will remain unstable, partly because of the current instability of
financial and foreign exchange markets; rates of export diversification are low in SSA,
openness of these countries to international trade is growing).
On the other hand, it may be reasonable to expect an attenuation in the deleterious impact of
negative external shocks on policy, for several reasons.  First, many SSA countries, faced
with the disastrous consequences of their poor policy choices in the past, have learnt to
manage the impact of shocks more skillfully.  This has been fostered by the conditionality
attached to foreign aid, as well as by the increasing level of competence of officials and the
diffusion of know-how.  Second, if one believes that the authoritarian and predatory behavior
of many regimes has, in the past, contributed to the poor management of external shocks
(Ndulu and O'Connell, 1999), the increasing degree of democratization that is observed
should be good news.  Third, the responsibility for managing external shocks has in many
cases been transferred from the public to the private sector.  Fourth, the international banking
system, which through the provision of cheap credit has, in the past, contributed to poor
economic policies has, for the moment at least, become more cautious in its lending policies.
Finally progress in regional initiatives in Africa (such as the UEMOA in West Africa) may
diminish the risk of seeing policy reforms reversed, at least in the areas of monetary and trade
policy, thanks to the dampening effect on shocks that these arrangements have had, as well as
through peers control.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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Political regimes, political instability and policy
Apart from the aforementioned determinants of economic policy in SSA, it is clear that the
nature of the political regimes in power also plays a significant role (Ndulu and O'Connell,
1999).  An important fraction of SSA countries have either experienced or are currently under
the sway of non-democratic regimes that vary in their degree of authoritarianism (Bratton and
van de Walle, 1997).   Besides the correlation between authoritarianism and poor governance,
it is worth pointing out that the slide into authoritarianism is itself affected by the structural
factors alluded to above.  Ethno-linguistic fragmentation, high rates of illiteracy and external
shocks have either contributed to the establishment of authoritarian regimes or served as a
justification for their maintenance, along with low levels of economic development.
3
Authoritarianism in Africa has been singled out as leading to poor public policies and low
rates of growth for two main reasons (Adam and O'Connell, 1999, O'Connell and Ndulu,
1999).  First, authoritarianism leads to the private appropriation of collective resources
(through excessive taxation that transfers resources to a privileged minority) and increases
transaction costs in the private sector (through increased corruption).  Second,
authoritarianism often leads to political instability which itself hinders growth.
Regardless of the form taken by African regimes, the risk of political violence and conflicts
represents, today, a major threat to the sustainability of reforms and growth in SSA.  It would
appear that political instability has been greater during the past twenty years in SSA than in
the rest of the developing world.  Of course, political instability takes many forms, but
regardless of the indicator that is chosen, be it coups, disturbances and looting, or civil and
foreign wars, SSA would appear to be more prone to political instability than the rest of the
developing world (see Figure 5).
4
The direct impact on growth of war or violent disturbances is obvious in that economic
activity is impaired and the capital stock is destroyed.  But in the case of more circumscribed
forms of political instability, the effect is probably felt through policies.  Political instability
may lead to the emigration of a portion of the competent elites, which may feel threatened. It
may entail problems in the realm of public finance as security expenditures soar or as
                                                
3 On the relationship between democracy and GDP per capita, see Barro 1999.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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propitiatory payments are made to guarantee the support of the party loyal or to quell a vocal
opposition.  Political instability may also put the brakes on structural reforms which might
endanger the rents accruing to elites whose support might therefore slacken.  Finally, it may
discourage potential investors who may doubt the regime's capacity to pursue sound policies
within a stable institutional framework in which property rights and the rule of law are
respected.  In the aforementioned article (Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney, Brun, 1999),
we found that political instability had a statistically significant and negative impact on
economic growth even when controlling for instability in the terms of trade and climatic
shocks, and that its impact is mediated through the investment rate and the real exchange rate.
In order to assess the effect of political instability on the sustainability of reforms and growth
in SSA, it should be noted that, as with the nature of the political regime, political instability
is not independent of three exogenous determinants of policy that we have so far considered.
Ethno-linguistic fragmentation and external shocks increase political instability, whereas
human capital reduces it.  While the former two remain high and the latter is low in SSA,
Collier (2000) has noted that the effect of many structural factors that determine the
probability of conflicts and wars is reduced as the process of democratization progresses.
External aid, sustainability and growth
A final factor that may affect reform in SSA as well as its sustainability is, of course, foreign
aid.  Apart from the potential direct impact of aid on policies, aid may affect policy indirectly
through its impact on the determinants of policy identified above.
Doubts regarding the impact of aid on policies in SSA have been raised based upon the failure
of conditionality and the inappropriate nature of policy, as revealed by the disguised nature of
the instruments and the reversibility of their use (Guillaumont P. and S., 1994, Collier,
Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Gunning, 1997).  More systematically some authors
have argued that the amount of aid had no effect on the quality of policy, an hypothesis they
consider as supported by econometric tests (Burnside and Dollar, 1997, 2000). Recently
however, the World Bank has commissioned a series of case studies concerning the
relationship between aid and reform.  The results are subject to a good deal of nuance
                                                                                                                                                        
4 According to CERDI data (for the 1970s and 1980s, see Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Brun, 1999).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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(Devarajan and Holmgren, 2001).  Aid is not without effect on the process of reform, but its
impact is a function of the circumstances faced by a given country as well as of the manner in
which the aid is allocated. Conditionality, as it was practiced, was apparently more
appropriate for authoritarian regimes than for democracies (see, e.g., the case study on Mali
by Guillaumont and alii, 2001).
It seems to us that aid can contribute to a sustainable improvement in policies and in growth if
it is allocated according to performance, i.e. to outcomes purged of (or adjusted for)
exogenous factor, instead of being tied to specific policy measures (which becomes less
sustainable as a country becomes more democratic) (Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont
Jeanneney, Gunning, 1997, Guillaumont P. and S., 1994, Guillaumont and Chauvet, 1999,
2001, Gunning, 2000).  The proof is in the pudding: performance reveals the quality of those
policies that were implemented, and the responsibility for the choice of instruments must lie
with the recipients themselves.  Aid can therefore allow countries to more fully appropriate
the reform process –surely one of the conditions for sustainable growth.
Second, to the extent that it can be targeted, aid should be directed towards the structural
determinants of policy identified above.  Aid should foster increases in human capital.  It
should help by compensating for the negative impact of external shocks and should foster
domestic mechanisms that improve the capacity to respond to such shocks.  Finally, aid can
affect those factors that reduce the risk of conflict, mainly democratization and regional
integration, the latter also leading to less reversibility in the reform process.
Finally, independently from its effect on policy itself, aid has an impact on growth which
depends on the vulnerability of the recipient to external shocks: aid is more efficient in more
vulnerable countries (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 1999, 2001).
5   Aid indeed lessens the
economic uncertainty resulting from vulnerability and avoids growth collapses after negative
shocks. Then and not only because vulnerability has a deleterious impact on policy, in order
to sustain growth in SSA (where many countries are vulnerable), a priority is to be given in
aid allocation to those countries which are most vulnerable. This conclusion is consistent with
                                                
5 This argument differs from that of Burnside and Dollar 1997, 2000 for whom aid contributes to growth only
when economic policies are sound, but has no impact on policy itself. According to our estimate the impact of
aid is more conditioned by vulnerability than by policy.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
13
a criterion of aid allocation according "performance", since for a given outcome the
performance will be judged better when vulnerability is higher
6.
It remains to be seen whether the level of aid will continue along the rapid decline that began
in the mid-90s, which has brought net public transfers, as a percentage of GDP of the African
recipient countries, to what they were a quarter of a century ago (see Figure 6).
Some preliminary empirical results  concerning the sustainability of reforms
and growth in Africa
The preceding analyses were based on recent empirical work, including our own, our goal
being to summarize those factors that determine the durability of the reform process in Africa
and therefore its growth. Diagram 1 provides a schematic representation of our arguments.
We have  begun empirical testing of the principal hypotheses formulated in this paper through
the estimation of a simple structural model which combines a growth equation and a policy
equation (the dependent variable in the latter being the index used by Burnside and Dollar,
1997).   Prior to discussing the empirical results associated with this approach, it is
worthwhile examining some empirical results that are typical of the current literature.
In table 1, columns 1, 2 and 3 present simple pooling results in which the dependent variable
is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita during the four nine-year periods into which
1965-1997 may be divided.  Apart from the usual (conditional) convergence effects, two
continent dummies and two time period dummies (insufficient observations are available on
the first time period, 1965-1973, to allow one to estimate its impact precisely), all three
columns highlight the importance of economic policies as a determinant of growth
performance.  In column 1, we include the initial level of schooling, but this significantly
reduces the number of observations, particularly from Sub-Saharan Africa.  In column 3, we
include ethnic fragmentation which takes the usual negative sign (Easterly and Levine).
Notice that, in column 2, political instability also appears as a significant determinant of the
growth rate of per capita GDP, although this result is "fragile" in the sense that inclusion of
human capital or ethnic diversity renders its effects insignificant.  As will be argued below
                                                
6 The implication of this competing hypothesis in terms of aid allocation are very much different from that ofCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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this fragility is not serious, and stems essentially from an endogeneity problem that is not
adequately accounted for in the simple pooling results.
Interesting as they may be, results based on a simple pooling of observations based on
different time periods fails to account for other, country-specific sources of heterogeneity in
growth performance that may not be adequately be captured by the explanatory variables
included in the specification.  In order to assess the impact of controling for country-specific
unobserved heterogeneity, column 4 presents results obtained through estimation with
country-specific fixed effects (random effects are soundly rejected by the usual Hausman test,
the p-value of which is presented at the bottom of the table).  As should be obvious, the
inclusion of country-specific fixed effects significantly reduces the statistical significance of
economic policies and political instability.
As mentioned earlier, endogeneity of economic policies and political instability is a
potentially important issue.  In column 5 we therefore present instrumental variable estimates
in which political instability, at least is allowed to be endogenous.  The instrumental variables
used in this procedure include the urbanization rate as well as educational expenditures as a
percentage of GDP which, as shall be demonstrated below are significant determinants in
cross-country differences in political instability.  As should be obvious from the results,
political instability now becomes stastically significant, and a test of the overidentifying
restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis of their validity.  Taken together, the results of
the instrumental variables procedure and the country-specific fixed effects approach suggest
that (i) endogeneity and (ii) unobserved, country-specific heterogeneity, constitute important
statistical issues that must be adequately addressed if the true link between economic growth,
political instability, and economic policy is to be uncovered (more on this below).
In table 2, columns 1 and 2 present results stemming from the estimation of an economic
policy regression.  In column 1, the most important covariate of the economic policy index is
export instability (which significantly worsens economic policy), as well as the growth rate of
GDP per capita (which significantly improves it). In column 2, we implement a procedure
which includes country-specific fixed effects, in order to control for unobserved differences in
economic policy that may be accounted for by a country's intrinsic characteristics.  The
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explanatory power of the regression is significantly improved (going from 0.36 in column 1 to
0.76 in column 2), and the exogenous improvement in economic policy associated with the
1989-1997 period is strengthened.  This result, which is common to columns 1 and 2, is
particularly important with respect to the sustainability of economic growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa, as it reveals that a world-wide improvement in economic policies was afoot during
this latter period.  Of course, given the inclusion of the growth rate of GDP per capita in the
regression (and given the inclusion of economic policy in the growth rate equations presented
in Table 1) all of these results remain subject to the caveat that they do not adequately account
for simultaneity bias.
In columns 4 and 5, we present results corresponding to the estimation of a political instability
equation.  In column 4, which stems from a simple pooling specification, the covariates of
political instability include the urbanization rate, which is found to operate in a U-shaped
manner on political instability, as well as the relative importance of educational expenditures,
which presumably reduce political instability by mitigating student unrest.  This effect is not
robust to the inclusion of country-specific fixed effects, as shown by the results presented in
column 5, which also result in a significant weakening of the quadratic impact of the
urbanization rate.  Again, these results must be taken with a grain of salt as the inclusion of
the growth rate of GDP per capita may be a source of significant simultaneity bias.
In order to achieve results which, at least from the statistical perspective, are robust to the
aforementioned critiques, we therefore resort to a GMM procedure (which eliminates
endogeneity problems), estimated in first differences (which eliminates bias stemming from
unobserved, country-specific heterogeneity).
7  The GMM procedure uses lagged values of the
explanatory variables themselves as instruments, as well as any exclusion restrictions that
stem from the specification of the structural system of equations.  Note that the growth
equation and the economic policy equations were estimated simultaneously, and that the
corresponding Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions (which does not reject the null
hypothesis of the validity of the set of instruments) applies to this system of equations.  The
political instability equation, for its part, was estimated separately.
                                                
7 In contrast to the fixed effects procedure, country-specific heterogeneity is allowed to vary over time, and is
only assumed to be constant in contiguous time periods --the two procedure would be identical in the case of two
periods.  Note that we also account for serial correlation in the GMM procedure.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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Results corresponding to these procedures are presented in column 6 of table 1 for the growth
rate regression, and columns 3 and 6 of table 2 for the economic policy and political
instability, respectively.  Our results show, apart from the standard conditional convergence
effect that remains significant in the growth equation, that economic policies and political
instability are key determinants of economic growth. It is also apparent that improvements in
economic policy stem from higher rates of growth and reductions in export instability.
Moreover, an exogenous improvement in policy is associated with the 1989-1997 period, as
indicated by the positive and statistically significant dummy, which may be attributed (one
hopes) to a durable improvement in policy.  This confirms the earlier finding of the simpler
econometric procedures presented in columns 1 to 3 of table 2.
In the political instability equation, we find that growth reduces political instability,
increasing urbanization raises it (with the characteristic quadratic relationship uncovered
earlier), while public spending on education reduces it. As with the growth policy equation,
there is an exogenous variation in political instability in the last time period, though in this
case the move is towards greater political instability. Diagram 2 provides a visual illustration
of these empirical results.
This model must, of course, be refined, in particular through the use of appropriate empirical
methods for the political instability equation. But our point has, we hope, been made: it is
impossible to consider the sustainability of reforms and growth in Africa without dealing
simultaneously with the determinants of political instability and conflict, which remain, to our
mind, as one of the major threats to the continued economic expansion of the continent.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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Concluding remarks
This analysis of the sustainability of African growth can be summarized in five propositions.
1.  The sustainability of growth depends upon the sustainability of policy reforms.
2. The sustainability of policy reform itself depends to a large extent on structural factors, in
particular on the level of human capital (although it is difficult to test this effect empirically
because of the slow rate of change, and small cross-country variations, particularly within
Africa, of conventionally used measures of human capital), and on the vulnerability of
countries to external shocks and political instability.
3. Political instability is itself influenced by the aforementioned structural factors (human
capital and external shocks) as well as by the rate of urbanization.
4. The impact of these various structural factors has been dampened in the last decade though
the political will of the countries in question and may be even more so in the future.
5. The impact of these structural factors could also be dampened by by foreign aid allocated
according to the "performance" of countries, i.e., taking simultaneously into account their
structural vulnerability and the quality of their economic policies.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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Diagram 1: basic relationships





















 in a simple structural model
Diagram 2: basic relationships






















1 2 3 4 5 6
log Initial GDP per capita -0.62 -0.28 -0.07 -2.83 -0.27 -4.94
-1.56 -1.01 -0.25 -2.49 -0.63 -4.75
Political instability -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 0.07 -1.02 -1.40
-1.34 -1.81 -0.91 0.54 -2.41 -1.89
Average years of education of population over 15 0.29
1.98
Economic policy index 1.02 1.04 1.09 0.29 0.31 2.19
4.81 5.23 5.76 0.85 0.78 2.86
Ethnic diversity -1.48
-1.93
Dummy 1981-1989 -1.21 -1.18 -1.50 -0.04 -0.61
-2.44 -2.60 -3.42 -0.05 -0.78
Dummy 1989-1997 -1.07 -1.02 -1.49 1.53 -0.32
-1.71 -1.81 -2.64 1.24 -0.36
Latin America -1.40 -1.39 -1.59 -2.21
-2.60 -2.75 -2.93 -2.64
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.83 -2.21 -1.54 -3.95
-3.18 -4.51 -3.01 -3.93
Intercept 5.40 4.15 3.14 6.60
2.24 2.16 1.56 2.20
adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.54 0.16 n.a.
s 2.39 2.33 2.17 1.93 3.21 n.a.
No. Observations 141 159 148 159 140 114
No. Observations from Sub-Saharan Africa 38 53 53 53 46 32
Test of overidentifying restrictions: p-value n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. [0.221] [0.438]
Hausman test: random effect vs fixed effects : p-value n.a. n.a. n.a. [0.011] n.a. n.a.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2001.05
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Table 2
Economic policy index and political instability: 1965-1997
t-statistics below coefficients













1 2 3 4 5 6
Annual growth rate of GDP per capita 0.10 0.06 0.10 -0.16 -0.08 -0.26
4.15 3.09 2.50 -3.60 -1.49 -5.95
Export instability -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
-3.56 -1.64 -2.21
Ethnic diversity
Urbanization rate 0.05 -0.06 0.18
1.80 -1.01 3.47
Urbanization rate, squared -0.001 0.001 -0.22
-1.91 1.79 -2.16
Education expenditures (% of GDP) -0.14 -0.04 -0.22
-1.63 -0.36 -3.12
Dummy 1973-1981 -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 -0.06
-0.19 -0.16 -0.27 -0.19
Dummy 1981-1989 -0.08 0.01 0.71 0.56
-0.49 0.09 1.64 1.39
Dummy 1989-1997 0.38 0.76 0.66 -0.21 0.41 0.8
2.17 6.12 5.91 -0.44 0.74 5.56
Latin America -0.94 -0.92
-6.62 -2.37




adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.76 n.a. 0.07 0.62 n.a.
SEE 0.93 0.57 n.a. 2.72 1.75 n.a.
No. Observations 282 282 114 337 337 149
No. Observations from SSA 74 74 31 105 105 42
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions n.a. n.a. [0.438] n.a. n.a. [0.235]
Hausman test:
random effect vs fixed effects : p-value
n.a. [0.002] n.a. n.a. [0.0002] n.a.Source: World Development indicators, 2000
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POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND IN OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
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